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STRUCTURING DISCRETION:
SENTENCING IN THE JURISIC AGE

DONNA SPEARS'

On 12 October 1998, the Court of Criminal Appeal headed by new Chief
Justice Spigelman ushered in a new phase in the history of sentencing in New
South Wales. In R v Jurisic,1 tne Court announced that from now on it will, in
appropriate cases, issue guideline judgments. On 13 October 1998, the Chief
Justice in an article written for and published in the Daily Telegraph labelled
this approach as "innovative and different". These guideline judgments
represent a departure from the traditional system of sentencing principles
developed through appellate review and involve the adoption of a more
structured approach. However, the introduction of such guidelines may also be
seen by some as an unacceptable engagement by the judiciary with populist
views and as an institutional acknowledgment of a law and order crisis. A wider
question is whether the judiciary is the appropriate body to implement
community concern, and whether such judicial activism creates an unacceptable
tension between the role of parliament and the proper functioning of the
judiciary.

I. THE DECISION IN R v JURISIC
Mr Jurisic (the respondent) pleaded guilty in the Local Court to three counts
of dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm in contravention of
s 52A(3)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Each of the three counts related to a
separate victim. He was committed for sentencing to the District Court where
the following sentences were imposed:
Count 1: sentenced to minimum term of nine months with an additional term
of nine months, both terms to be served by way of home detention. A licence
disqualification period of 12 months was also imposed.

*

BA(Hons), LLM(Hons); Barrister.
R v lurisic [1998] NSWSC 597 (12 October 1998).
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Counts 2 and 3: on each count, pursuant to s 558 of the Crimes Act, sentence
deferred upon respondent entering into a recognisance himself in the sum of
$1,000 to be of good behaviour for a period of two years and to accept
supervision of the Probation and Parole service.
The Crown appealed on the grounds that the sentences imposed were
inadequate. The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the
sentence imposed below on the first count, and sentenced the respondent to
imprisonment for two years comprising a minimum term of one year and an
additional term of one year. A licence disqualification period of two years was
also ordered.
In passing judgment, the Full Bench of the Court of Criminal Appeal issued
the first guideline for New South Wales, which read as follows:
(1) A non-custodial sentence for an offence against s 52A should be exceptional and
almost invariably confined to cases involving momentary inattention or
misjudgment.

(2) With a plea of guilty, wherever there is. present to a material degree any
aggravating factor involving the conduct of the offender, a custodial sentence
(minimum plus additional or fixed term) of less than three years (in the case of
dangerous driving causing death) and less than two years (i~ the case of dangerous
driving causing grievous bodily harm) should be exceptional.

A list of aggravating factors, including, inter alia, speed and degree of
intoxication, was provided by Chief Justice Spigelman.

II. INTRODUCING GUIDELINES
Spigelman CJ, in his leading jUdgment, indicated clearly that:
guideline judgments should now be recognised in New South Wales as having a
useful role to play in ensuring that an appropriate balance exists between the broad
discretion that must be retained to ensure that justice is done in each individual case,
on the one hand, and the desirability of consistency in sentencing and the
maintenance of public confidenpe in sentences actually imposed, and in the
judiciary as a whole, on the other.

This notion of guideline judgments is derived from the pre-1998 guideline
judgments issued by the English Court of Appeal. 4 After referring with approval
to Dunn LJ in R v De Havilland,5 Spigelman CJ said:
The existence of multiple objectives in sentencing - rehabilitation, denunciation and
deterrence - permits individual judges to reflect quite different penal philosophies.
2
3
4
5

Ibid at 37, per Spigelman CJ.
Ibid at 14-15.
H Donnelly, "Guideline judgments: from tariffs to starting points" (1998) 5 Criminal Law News 93.
(1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 109 at 114.
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This is not a bad thing in a field in which "the only golden rule is that there is no
golden rule": [see R v Geddes (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 554 at 554-5, per Jordan eJ].
Indeed, judges reflect the wide range of differing views on such matters that exists
in the community. However, there are limits to the permissible range of variation.
The courts must show that they are responsive to public criticism of the outcome of
sentencing processes. Guideline judgm~ts are a mechanism for structuring
discretion, rather than restricting discretion.

III. ASSESSING THE NEED FOR GUIDELINE JUDGMENTS
The Chief Justice observed that "[s]ignificant disparity between public
opinion and judicial sentencing will eventually lead to a reduction in the
perceived legitimacy of the legal system".7 He also suggested that "[p]ublic
criticism of particular sentences for inconsistency or excessive leniency is
sometimes justified".8 The recognition of this situation is the justification for
the introduction of a corrective measure: the guideline judgment.
This explicit acknowledgement by a court that some public criticism of
sentencing disparity is warranted is remarkable. Traditionally, the courts have
taken the view that they should not be swayed by public opinion from their duty
to administer justice fairly and impartially, nor be influenced by the tide of
public opinion generally. However, it is clear that the courts should not stand
aloof from the community that they serve. As Justice Michael Kirby has
observed:
Judges are there to give dispassionate decisions, uninfluenced by the strong forces
that can rise and swell and then retreat again in popular opinion. It is a feature of
our time that our political institutions tend to live from day to day. It will be, I
think, an unhappy development if the courts were equally prone to respond in that
way to passing political fancies. By the same token, the courts serve the community
of citizens of whom they are members and it is important for them to be aware of
changing moral, social, tech~ological values in the community and, in a general
sense, keep up with the times.

The proposed use of guideline judgments is consonant with this balancing
exercise.
The other interesting feature of the judgment in lurisic is that the Court is
responding to public opinion as manifested in the media. Although some
academic authors have doubted the existence of a discrete and discernible body
of sentiment known as public opinion regarding policy related issues in crime

6
7
8
9

Note 1 supra at 17, per Spigelman.
Ibid at 20.
Ibid at 17.
Quoted in an interview in G Sturgess and P Chubb, Judging the World: Law and Politics in the World's
Leading Courts, Butterworths (1988) p 370.
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and justice,IO it is clear that the Court is concerned to explain and justify its
decision-making process.
Adams J in his judgment notes a need for caution in courts addressing public
perceptions:
[W]hilst the Courts must do everything in their power so to act that public
confidence is maintained, and whilst the importance of public perceptions must be
accepted (and without resentment or patronising) we must treat with care assertions
about what might be the public perception about this or that issue. Nor can
publicity about a particular case or cases deflect a Court ever from doing justice
according to law. To do so would be, amongst other things, to betray the trust that
the overwhelming majority of 8itizens place in the Courts to stand as a bulwark
against prejudice and unreason.

IV. ERODING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE?
Spigelman CJ notes that in Victoria guideline judgments were not
implemented because, it is reported, of resistance by judges of the Supreme
Court. A significant question to be addressed is: does structuring sentencing
discretion amount to restricting judicial discretion? This is a corollary to the
larger question as to whether restricting discretion in sentencing undermines
judicial independence and accountability.
As to this latter question, Tonry has referred with approval to Ashworth'sl2
argument that:
it is a confusion to conflate protection of the judge's power, within applicable law,
to decide the facts of individual disputes and apply the law to them - a process at
the core of judicial independence - with protection of the judge's preferences1lo set
sentences free from standards that might constrain [the] exercise of discretion.

The restriction of discretion in sentencing does not automatically undermine
judicial independence.
In downplaying the impact of guidelines on judicial discretion, the Court
emphasised the continuity between statements of sentencing principle and
guideline judgments:
This court, like other courts of criminal appeal, has frequently stated principles of
general application with respect to appropriate sentences for particular offences.
Such statements have, in part, the characteristics of a guideline judgment. The

10

II
12
13

See, for example, AM Durham m, "Public Opinion Regarding Sentences for Crime: Does it Exist?"
(1993) 21 Journal o/Criminal Justice 1.
Note I supra at 3-4, per Adams 1.
AI Ashworth, "Sentencing Reform Structures" in M Tonry (ed), Crime and Justice: A Review of
Research, University of Chicago Press (volume 16, 1992) 181.
M Tonry, "Sentencing Reform Across National Boundaries" in C Clarkson and R Morgan (eds), The
Politics of Sentencing Reform, Clarendon Press (1995) 267 at 273.
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formal step of recognising that the Court d9.~s issue such guidelines is a logical
development of what the Court has long done.
This claim that guideline judgments already form part of the practice of the
Court of Criminal Appeal is a way for the Court to take ownership of the
otherwise English concept of the guideline judgment. It is also an answer to the
criticism that the creation of guideline judgments involves the judiciary in a nonjudicial function that is properly the role of parliament. As Wood J observed:
By tagging selected decisions as' guideline judgments, the Court is not to be taken as
usurping the function of the legislature, or as inappropriately intruding into the
exercise of the sentencing discretion reserved to trial judges. Rather, what is
intended is for the Court of Criminal Appeal to highlight the sentencing principles
which fall for it to determine, in a way that might assist trial judges, the DPP and
trial counsel, and reduce the occasion for thahdegree of inconsistency or departure
from principle that is an indicator of injustice.

v.

DANGERS IN GUIDELINES THEMSELVES

One problematic aspect of the lurisic decision is the presumption by the Court
that the creation of guidelines will be usually prompted by Crown appeals. The
16
purpose of Crown appeals is to correct manifestly inadequate sentences.
Therefore, guideline judgments developed in such a context will be used to set
higher sentencing benchmarks. It is troubling that Spigelman CJ observed:
A guideline judgment is more likely to arise in the context of a Crown appeal than
in the context of an appeal against severity by an offender. In the usual case it will
be the Director of Public Prosecutions who draws the attention of the Court of
Criminal Appeal to the background circumstances, in terms of inconsistency of
judgments and other matters, which may makY7it desirable to promulgate a guideline
judgment with respect to a particular offence.
If the stated purpose of the introduction of guideline judgments is to maintain
public confidence by reducing public criticism of disparate sentences, then it is
not axiomatic that such guidelines can only arise from Crown appeals.
Logically, unduly harsh sentences in individual cases may equally threaten the
integrity of the legal system, by showing that the system is harsh and capricious.
It is troubling that the mindset of the Court is already geared towards Crown
appeals as providing the building blocks of guideline judgments.
Perhaps it is for this reason that the Attorney-General has announced
18
legislative reform that will enable to the Court of Criminal Appeal, on the
14

Note 1 supra at 9. per Spigelrnan CJ.

15
16
17
18

Ibidat2.perWoodJ.
Everett v The Queen; Phillips v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295.
Note 1 supra at 19. per Spigelrnan CI.
Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sentencing Guidelines) Act 1998 (NSW) see especially the new s 26
inserted into the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW).
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application of the Attorney-General, to issue guidelines as free standing
documents; that is, guidelines that are not related to particular appeal cases.
However, this legislation is inherently dangerous, both because it blurs the
distinction between the executive and the judiciary and because it may prove to
be unworkable. 19
It is also interesting that the first guideline judgment involved dangerous
driving occasioning death or grievous bodily harm. The original s 52A, which
was inserted into the Crimes Act and operative from 6 November 1951, was
introduced because of the reluctance of the courts to convict drivers of
manslaughter in the factual circumstances envisaged by the section. 2o It would
be ironic if the effect of the lurisic guideline was to reduce the number of
convictions. This could occur in two ways; first by jurors becoming aware of the
new sentencing guideline and declining to convict, or secondly by accused
persons declining to plead guilty to such a charge on the basis of the perceived
limited discretion to impose other than a custodial sentence.

VI. SETTING A NEW DIRECTION FOR SENTENCING
The adoption of guidelines by the Court in lurisic is a move tailored to meet
modem concerns about perceived disparity and undue leniency in sentencing.
These concerns are by no means new to New South Wales or indeed to common
law jurisdictions. One international commentator, Michael Tonry, has observed
that sentencing reformers whatever their jurisdiction must all confront the
"antipodean twins" of discretion and disparity.21 Guideline judgments appear to
be an acceptable way of structuring sentencing discretion without unduly
intruding on judicial discretion.
But perhaps the true significance of the decision in lurisic is that it is an
example of a modem court challenging the unspoken conformity principle of the
common law. Judges have traditionally eschewed controversy or media
attention. Through the co-ordinated release of the judgment and the publication
of ari article by the Chief Justice in a major daily newspaper, the Court is
actively seeking to capture the public interest and take ownership of and
responsibility for sentencing policy, which has so long been the bastard child of
public policy. This engagement with the media represents an interesting
development in the history of the New South Wales judiciary. For:
When judges begin talking to the media ... they are trying to create more informed
public discussion, they are searclJ~ng for understanding, they are making themselves
in some sense more accountable.

19

20
21
22

For more detail as to these cogent criticisms by commentators including the Director of Public
Prosecutions and the Senior Public Defender see E McWilliams, "Sentencing guidelines: who should be
the arbiter, the judiciary or parliament?" (1998) 36(11) Law Society Journal 48.
Attorney-General v Bindoff(1953) 53 SR (NSW) 489 at 490, per Owen J.
Tonry, note 13 supra at 268.
Sturgess and Chubb, note 9 supra at 180.
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Such moves towards institutional accountability and openness by courts are to
be applauded. The move to guideline judgments is, as Adams J in lurisic
observes, an example of a modern court bringing "to notice a basic conception
that underlies the recognition of the fundamental im~ortance of the rule .of law in
a liberal democracy and our attempts to maintain it". 3

23

Note 1 supra at 4, per Adams J.

